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Introduction
The title for this section of the Symposium is posed as a question:
"Global or Local Justice?" To regard this as a genuine or serious question,
one must assume that "global justice" is actually a plausible alternative.
Not long ago, there seemed to be quite a number of advocates insisting that
only global justice-that is, an independent, international tribunal-was
appropriate for dealing with monsters like Saddam Hussein.' The idea cer-
tainly had considerable appeal for international law scholars. It also had
great appeal for human rights advocates, who are, for their own reasons,
much given to thinking like law professors.
The appeal of global justice is that it can avoid improper entanglement
in local idiosyncrasies, provincial prejudice, national or political self-inter-
est. What embraces the whole must be impartial, since it encompasses
everyone. From this perspective, global justice may appear to be the high-
est justice. If it cannot be available to everyone, at least it must claim prior-
ity-when it can be deployed-over every other form of justice. From this
perspective, local or national justice will necessarily appear to be a lesser
form of justice or a form of justice that has lesser dignity.
There is also, perhaps, another attraction: Global justice is largely
unencumbered by established laws and institutions. Global justice might
develop on any path which law professors and human rights advocates
judge to be the best path. What the specialists on justice would consider to
be the proper standards for justice would simply be the proper standards.
Agreement among them should not be hard to reach, moreover, since spe-
cialists on international justice are agreeable people-and the disagreeable
need not be consulted.
f Professor of Government, Cornell University.
1. See, e.g., Timothy Garton Ash, We Must Tackle Saddam's Legacy with Fair Trials in
the Hague, THE GUARDIAN (London), April 10, 2003, at 27; Bob Sherwood, Iraq-based
War Crimes Tribunal Likely to Face Human Rights and Expertise Problems, FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), Dec. 15, 2003 at 3.
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It is a vision that captivated the world of international law scholarship
for a brief moment in the 1990s. But that moment has passed. It lives on
in the ghostly half-life of its one remaining legacy: the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC). That rather pathetic institution has managed to retain an
existence of sorts by determinedly avoiding its original agenda and desper-
ately hiding itself in the underbrush of stateless regions.
The original, brighter dream of global justice may have died when ter-
rorists brought down the twin towers of the World Trade Center in 2001.
Or it may have died when the U.N. Security Council refused to enforce its
own rulings against Saddam Hussein in 2003 and an American-led coali-
tion proceeded to overthrow that monstrous tyrant without U.N. approval.
2
Or perhaps the dream really died when a new government in Iraq insisted
on mounting its own trial of Saddam, to the chagrin of so many interna-
tional legal analysts. 3 But the happy vision of global justice, which
animated so many nice people in the 1990s, was bound to dissolve when
reality intruded. It is a matter of taste whether one wants to say the dream
is now simply "dead" or only "brain dead"-that is, irretrievably comatose.
Global justice was always a dream. It is only in dreams where things
that do not fit together in real life can be brought together without shock or
confusion. If global justice were something real, the victims of mass atroci-
ties throughout the world would have powerful claims against it. In the real
world, there is no global authority to be held accountable for the world's
enduring miseries. The professors and nongovernmental organization
(NGO) advocates are the first to disclaim responsibility for the horrors that
persist in our world. They are strongly opposed to mass murder, as well as
sex discrimination, and other offenses against human rights.4 Their job is
simply to clarify the rules that render such wrongdoing illegal. So they
must be allowed to continue their important work, setting down learned
expositions of what international law requires or forbids. They are not
2. See, e.g. Matthew Sandgren, War Redefined in the Wake of September 11: Were the
Attacks Against Iraq Justified?, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1, 46-56 (2004) (suggesting that
the United States rightly circumvented the outmoded U.N. Charter provisions governing
the use of force in initiating attacks on the Middle East).
3. See Michael Scharf, Is it International Enough?: A Critique of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal in Light of the Goals of International Justice, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 330 (2004)
(arguing that, unlike previous international criminal tribunals, the Iraqi Special Tribu-
nal is not sufficiently international and "risks being seen by both Iraqis and outsiders as
a puppet of the Occupying power, and as a tool for vengeance for Saddam Hussein's
enemies, rather than as the cornerstone of a new judicial system, committed to the rule
of law").
4. See, e.g. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. (a) (1990) (stating that "genocide and slavery" have attained the status of
universal prohibitions, binding on all states, whether they have ratified particular trea-
ties or not.); see also Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Contemporary Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 7 n. 43 (1996) (reporting that
"[1]ess than a decade later, the chief reporter for the Restatement indicated in a speech
that 'if he were drafting Sec. 702 today he would include as customary international law
rights . . . freedom from gender discrimination plus the right to personal autonomy
(presumably in relation to sexual practices] .... "). The absence of international
response to the genocide in Rwanda does not seem to have affected this vision of the
forward march of customary international law of human rights.
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responsible for seeing that their standards are enforced. It is not their fault
that all their legal analyses, filled as they are with massed citations and
impeccable reasoning, do not actually constrain terrorists or warlords or
murderous tyrannies.
People who suffer the most terrible oppression hope that effective
force will come to their rescue. Sometimes that does actually happen. Rev-
olutions sometimes do overthrow terrible tyrannies. Outside powers do
sometimes intervene and topple dictators or restore order. Americans
secured their liberty with assistance from France in the eighteenth century
and repaid that debt-with all the accumulated interest-by saving France
and its neighbors from far more terrible tyranny in 1944. Iraqis were saved
from a monstrous tyranny by an Anglo-American coalition in 2003. And
the same outside powers helped Iraqis to organize effective responses to
terrorist barbarism in the aftermath of the war.
The United Nations, however, has never approved an outside interven-
tion on humanitarian grounds, and never helped sponsor a revolution
against an existing government, no matter how barbarous its conduct.5
There are good reasons and bad for the passivity of the organized interna-
tional community. But the fact remains, for good or for ill, that the world
does not agree on when conditions justify either revolution or outside
intervention. When it comes to genuinely effective responses, there is very
little law to rely upon. There are arguments about justice, but these argu-
ments are seen in different ways, or invoked in different ways, by different
observers. So justice remains local in several senses.
There is no serious alternative to this difficulty. The "international
community" -whatever that may mean-is not organized to act on behalf of
particular suffering peoples. To wait for international agreement is not a
way of securing justice, but of paralyzing action, which often means lend-
ing protection to existing threats and existing evils. To say that this world
is governed ultimately by law is to say that everything in it is a necessary
evil. That thought may be more palatable to professors in comfortable
offices than for people suffering under terrible tyrannies. To acknowledge
that justice is inevitably partial is, at the least, a source of some consola-
tion to the oppressed. 6 They need not accept the childish conceit of law
professors that a few more learned articles will help bring relief from their
5. See AREND & BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N.
CHARTER PARADIGM, 84-85 (1993) (discussing the principle of non-intervention embod-
ied in the U.N. Charter); Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under
the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L. J. 887, 889-96 (1992).
6. The point was not lost on the American Founders. They had, after all, launched
a revolution with a declaration about the "right of the people to alter or abolish" their
existing "form of government"-a right only made good in their case with foreign mili-
tary assistance. James Madison, in an essay published in 1792, criticized the proposal
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau for a peace-keeping federation, guaranteeing all existing gov-
ernments from military challenge: Madison protested that it would be "the tendency of
his plan to perpetuate arbitrary power wherever it existed and by extinguishing the hope
of one day seeing an end of oppression, to cut off the only source of consolation remain-
ing to the oppressed." James Madison, Universal Peace, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 505
(Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1999).
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miseries. And if they manage, somehow, to escape from the strangling
coils of tyranny, newly freed people need not, in real life, feel bound to
accept the admonitions of international legal scholars on what they must
do next.
In what follows, I will try to explain why the dream of global justice
deserves to be forgotten, starting with a brief demonstration of the fact that
this dream only came upon the world in the soft, warm international envi-
ronment of the mid-1990s, when governments could see only endless
peace and accumulating prosperity on the horizon. As dreams often have
only the most tenuous connection to waking experience, the dream of
global justice had almost no reliable grounding in past practice or in gener-
ally accepted political or legal doctrines.
The rest of the argument will sketch the enduring relevance of tradi-
tional objections to global justice. First, it does not acknowledge the need
for force in ensuring justice and therefore invites the reckless conclusion
that justice can be accomplished among nations by legal proceedings
alone. Second, it fails to reckon with the political difficulties of establish-
ing a new regime, where force can be minimized only if justice is tempered
by political calculation. Finally, it greatly underrates the extent to which
criminal law gains its noblest end by expressing communal condemnation,
which must be the condemnation of a particular community to have any
serious effect and any lasting meaning.
I. Innovation in a Dreamy Moment
When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) was established in 1993,7 it was widely hailed as the first interna-
tional criminal tribunal since Nuremberg.8 But the so-called International
Military Tribunal, which placed Nazi leaders on trial at Nuremberg in
1945, was not truly international. 9 That earlier tribunal was organized and
staffed by the four powers then occupying Germany: the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France. These powers sought no
advice from other powers in organizing the tribunal and sought no assis-
tance in conducting the trials. These powers categorically refused to place
their own soldiers or officials under the jurisdiction of the tribunal they
had created for the trial of German leaders. No one thought it odd that,
when the trial of the first two-dozen Nazi leaders had ended, each of the
7. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1192, available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm [hereinaf-
ter ICTY Statute].
8. See, e.g., Ed Vulliamy, For the First Time in 50 Years an International Tribunal Is
Hearing Charges of Crimes Against Humanity, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct 31, 1995;
Editorial, Not Since Nuremberg, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1994, at C8.
9. For an elaboration of the decidedly non-international elements of the Nurem-
berg proceedings, see Jeremy Rabkin, Nuremberg Misremembered, 19.2 SAIS REVIEW 81
(1999).
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participating nations proceeded to organize trials for lesser Nazi criminals
entirely on its own, within its own occupation zones.
The tribunal organized at Tokyo for the trial of Japanese war criminals,
at the same time, was even less international. 10 Here, too, nations directly
involved in the war against Japan organized the tribunal on their own, with-
out involving neutral states or any larger international gathering. At
Tokyo, the judges represented a larger group of victor nations (eleven in
all). In other respects, the international component of the Tokyo trials was
more limited than at Nuremberg. The United States, which organized the
occupation of Japan on its own, also established the charter for the war
crimes tribunal in Tokyo on its own, then decided on its own which Japa-
nese officers and officials to charge before the tribunal. Thereafter, as a
recent history notes, Americans exercised "control of prosecution policy
and strategy [which] bordered on the absolute."1 1 So, for example, when
General MacArthur advised Washington that the Emperor of Japan should
not be charged before the tribunal, Hirohito was not charged. Presenta-
tions by prosecutors carefully skirted any serious discussion of the
Emperor's responsibility for Japanese crimes and policies of aggression.
The Yugoslav tribunal was, by contrast, genuinely international. It
was created by the U.N. Security Council. 12 Its prosecutors, if they
answered to anyone, answered to the Council as a whole rather than any
particular government. And at least in principle, the tribunal could try
anyone charged with having committed war crimes in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia, even if a citizen of a nation on the Security Council
(whose European members already had peace keeping units in the
region). 13 Perhaps most notably, the ICTY was supposed to administer
justice over a territory that was not, either in principle or in practice, under
the overall control of the Security Council nor of any member of the Coun-
cil. The ICTY was supposed to do justice on behalf of humanity in territo-
ries supposed to be otherwise under the control of sovereign states.
So, this was not the first tribunal of its kind in fifty years, as was com-
monly said. It was the first of its kind-ever. It was a project that could not
even have been seriously considered in any earlier period. The League of
Nations and the U.N. itself had never given serious thought to imposing an
international criminal tribunal on otherwise independent nations. True,
the 1948 Convention on the Punishment of Genocide made vague refer-
ence to a possible future international tribunal for the trial of this crime. 14
10. See JOHN W. DOVER, EMBRACING DEFEAT, JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II
458 (W.W. Norton 1999).
11. Id.
12. See generally S.C. Res. 827 & ICTY Statute, supra note 7.
13. See ICTY Statute, supra note 7, art. 1 ("The International Tribunal shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanita-
rian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991"-with no
restrictions regarding the nationality or status of such "persons.").
14. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. VI,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention] ("Persons charged with genocide ... shall be tried by a competent
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But proposals floated by international jurists always assumed that the
jurisdiction of such a court would only be triggered by requests from the
home state of the accused. 15 Anything more ambitious seemed out of the
question amidst the general atmosphere of suspicion and distrust between
the superpowers (and their respective allies) during the Cold War.
By the 1990s, Cold War divisions had vanished. Communist author-
ity had collapsed throughout eastern Europe. The Soviet Union itself had
fallen to pieces. Suddenly, international cooperation seemed to have vastly
more potential. The World Bank proclaimed a "Washington consensus" on
economic development: free markets, and secure protection for private
property, were the way forward, and everyone now agreed. Meanwhile,
environmentalists imagined that all nations could come to agree on plans
for limiting fossil fuel use throughout the world in order to contain climate
change. A world where all nations were in fundamental agreement was a
world in which longstanding local conflicts could finally be guided to
peaceful resolution by international mediation. Peace in the Middle East
would follow shortly, after Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
and leading Arab states had been brought together at the 1991 Madrid
conference.
Everything seemed possible. A book published in that era had the
resonant title The End of History and the Last Man.16 Its thesis was that,
with no more serious matters to dispute, human life was in danger of
becoming so comfortable and secure that human beings would become
altogether frivolous. It was a best seller.
To be sure, previous generations also were seized with great visions
amidst post-war euphoria. After the Allied victory in the First World War,
the victors proposed a League of Nations to ensure a lasting peace for all
time. When the League and its peace failed, a new generation dreamed of a
United Nations that would assure peace and promote human rights every-
where. But previous visions were, in important ways, more tempered. The
United States not only declined to join the League of Nations in 1919. It
proceeded, instead, to sponsor a naval treaty that actually achieved the pre-
war American goal of establishing a navy "second to none."'1 7 The U.N.
Charter envisioned a world of peaceful cooperation through international
institutions. But the framers of the Charter still thought to equip the Secur-
[national] tribunal ... or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction
. . . . .).
15. For review of previous proposals by the International Law Commission and
others, see James Crawford, Drafting the Rome Statute, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE
143-44 (Phillipe Sands ed., 2003).
16. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (MacMillan 1992).
17. Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat.
1655, reprinted in 2 BEVANS 351 (1968); see HAROLD & MARGARET SPROUT, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN NAVAL POWER, 1776-1918, at 334-46 (Princeton University Press 1946) (dis-
cussing the debate over the Navy Act of 1916, and reporting, among other things, that
the act committed the United States to a program of naval expenditures increasing seven
times more than the increase of British expenditures in the decade before 1914 and sixty
times more than German increases before the outbreak of the war-at a time when Brit-
ain and Germany were conceived to be in a naval arms race).
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ity Council with international military advisors in case the peace needed to
be enforced. 18 They even thought to equip the Council with an interna-
tional bomber force, so the military advisors would have something to
work with. 19
After the world wars, those who projected new plans for peace did not
forget that peace had been won only after victory in war. The Cold War
may have ended in victory for western democracies, but it was victory
achieved without all-out war. The experience seems to have encouraged
the notion that international justice could now be achieved by setting stan-
dards. And if those standards proved to be less than self-executing, they
could be enforced by new international institutions: by international
courts. There was suddenly a great deal of interest-at least among legal
scholars-in "the legacy of Nuremberg." Enthusiasm for war crimes trials
seemed to imply that international law had been crippled for decades only
because the Nuremberg tribunal had closed its doors prematurely. Of
course, by such reasoning, one might think the real mistake was in not
convening the Nuremberg tribunal some years earlier-or, since that site
would not have been available in 1941, at least a London or Boston tribu-
nal. A great deal of "preparatory work" for Nuremberg, which in the actual
circumstances had to be left to division commanders under Eisenhower,
Montgomery and Zhukov, could then have been handed straight off to the
lawyers.
As it turned out, there were still serious problems for the world, even
in the 1990s, even in Europe. Some of these challenges were finally tackled
in the old-fashioned way that architects of the U.N. had envisioned-by
bombing. But that recourse came later. And, as might have been
expected, it came outside the confines of existing international law.
Neither American bombing in Bosnia in 1995 nor NATO bombing in Ser-
bia in 1999, to force a settlement over Kosovo, were authorized by the
Security Council.
Before that, however, there was an experiment in security through lawyer-
ing. It provided an object lesson on the limitations of international law,
especially international criminal law. In the special, dreamy atmosphere
of the 1990s, the world needed to learn the lesson over again. If it had
remembered that lesson, it would not have created the first truly interna-
tional criminal tribunal and dreamed that it could move straight from
moral indignation to morally satisfying war crimes trials-skipping the
unpleasant military operations that had preceded the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials. This short-cut was immensely convenient at the time. The
world still couldn't agree on the when and where and how of military inter-
ventions. It found it much easier to agree on interventions by international
lawyers. The charm of this approach was such that, when faced with mass
slaughter in Rwanda in 1994, the U.N. actually withdrew its peace-keeping
18. U.N. Charter art. 47.
19. Id. art. 45.
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forces on the ground in that bleeding nation, and eventually replaced these
potential lifesavers with teams of unarmed layers.
II. Moral Hazards
The most obvious problem with international criminal justice is that it
focuses on the very last and most formal part of the "criminal justice sys-
tem." Most of the force of criminal law comes from police. Even indicted
criminals in the United States usually do not receive a trial, because evi-
dence gathered by police convinces defendants that prosecutors would
likely prevail in a trial. Even so, most police officers spend most of their
time in activities unrelated to gathering evidence of past crimes. They
spend most of their time simply demonstrating their presence, as, notably,
by walking a beat or patrolling in marked cars. The presence of police is
thought to deter crime.
The world does not have a standing police force to deter international
crimes. That is one major reason why justice-in the sense of criminal
justice-was historically regarded as the exclusive responsibility of sover-
eign states. Only sovereign states are equipped to provide reliable enforce-
ment to criminal prohibitions. Providing international forums for criminal
trials is providing only the very last and, in some ways, the least controver-
sial part of a criminal justice system. The idea that the U.N. would send
blue-helmet patrols to all countries to enforce international criminal law
would provoke outrage-or gales of laughter. It is, to say the least, highly
optimistic to think that judges and prosecutors, operating without reliable
policing in the background, can secure criminal justice on their own.
The obvious danger posed by this fanciful notion is that, in focusing
on the easy part, attention is directed away from the far more important
elements of enforcement. In the eighteenth century, when piracy on the
high seas was acknowledged by all states as an "international crime," no
one imagined that such crimes could be suppressed simply by establishing
an international tribunal for pirates. Everyone understood that only naval
power, wielded by actual states, could have any success in battling pirates.
National navies were quite effective at suppressing piracy, because national
navies were available to do so.
Contemporary aims are more ambitious. Mass murder, on the scale
perpetrated by Europeans during the Second World War, was such a depar-
ture from anything imagined in the modern world, that a new name had to
be coined to describe this crime: "genocide." To prevent such horrors in
the future was seen as one of the urgent missions of the new international
organization founded by the Allied victors at the end of the war. Unlike the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the U.N. Charter gave the new organi-
zation responsibility for promoting "human rights."' 20  The very first
human rights instrument prepared by the U.N. was the Convention on the
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It is telling, however, that the geno-
20. U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 1(3), 13(1), 55, 62, 68, 76.
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cide convention does not commit any nation to do more than extradite
perpetrators to a jurisdiction where they can be tried. It makes no provi-
sion for intervention to stop a program of mass murder while it is still
going forward. 2
1
In the Second World War, the program of mass murder conducted by
Germany and its various client states, such as Hungary and France, was
only stopped by the victory of Soviet and Anglo-American arms. Indict-
ments in London would not have made any difference and were not
attempted while the war was in progress. But the Allied powers were, at
least, straining all their resources to defeat Germany and its clients.
If they are not already at war for their own reasons, however, few
nations are prepared to take great risks to save citizens of other nations.
Outsiders are prepared to send food and medical supplies to assist in
humanitarian crises. They are rarely prepared to send troops, especially
when those troops are likely to face hostile fire. There are better and worse
reasons for outside powers to hesitate over committing their own soldiers
to humanitarian interventions. But there are always reasons. Since it is
always easier to send lawyers to an international tribunal than to send
troops to the site of the killing, there is an obvious risk that organizing an
international tribunal will become a substitute for organizing an effective
military response. But lawyers are not an adequate substitute.
In the insurance industry, it is called "moral hazard"-the danger that
people behave less cautiously when they think they are insured against the
consequences of reckless conduct. Establishing international tribunals
can easily encourage a diplomatic version of this syndrome: a quite unjus-
tified confidence that the international community has provided an effec-
tive response to humanitarian crisis, when it has not.
The danger is not speculative. The Yugoslav tribunal itself is a perfect
example. The United States was the first to call for this special tribunal in
1993. At the time, the Clinton administration was extremely averse to com-
mitting troops to the Balkans. American troops sent to Somalia the year
before (to protect food shipments from attacks by warlords) had become
entangled in firefights with guerrilla forces. The troops had to be hastily
withdrawn after the bodies of the dead American soldiers were dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu. Establishing a tribunal became a substi-
tute for a more considered and effective military intervention in Yugoslavia.
It turned out to be a quite ineffectual substitute. One of the most terri-
ble episodes in the ongoing Balkan conflict was the massacre of Bosnian
Muslim civilians in the town of Srbrenica by Serb militia forces. 22 The
massacre took place after the establishment of the tribunal. Even more tell-
21. Article 8 of the Convention on the Punishment of Genocide authorizes as party
to the treaty to "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such
action under the [U.N.] Charter as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
suppression of acts of genocide"-but does not commit the U.N. to take any particular
action or any response of any kind. Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. 8.
22. See, e.g., JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A WAR
CRIME xix (Penguin Books USA 1997) [hereinafter HONIG & BOTH].
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ingly, it took place in a town that had been proclaimed by the U.N. as a safe
haven for Bosnian Muslims. 23 People were invited to take refuge in that
town, with assurances that U.N. peacekeeping forces, which could not stem
the general tide of violence, would at least assure the safety of people who
sought haven in Srebrenica. Yet the Dutch peace-keepers, who had not
been prepared for actual fighting, stood by while nearly ten thousand peo-
ple were slaughtered. 24 The Dutch troops did not even communicate with
U.N. authorities to seek guidance or assistance while the killing was under-
way. The Dutch government had made no serious effort to prepare its
troops to provide effective protection to anyone. Perhaps the Dutch govern-
ment imagined that it had already made its main contribution by offering
to host a war crimes tribunal at The Hague.
Low-level warfare, aiming at holding or ethnically cleansing disputed
territory, continued in the Balkans throughout the first half of the 1990s.
What stopped Serb militias in Bosnia was the intervention of countering
force-most decisively, counterforce from American air power. In 1999,
Serb troops in Kosovo were stopped from retaliating on Albanians in the
province by the intervention of NATO (mostly American) bombing. How
much of the carnage might have been averted by earlier and more focused
interventions is still debated. Scarcely anyone argues that a higher profile
role for the Hague tribunal would have done anything to reduce the blood-
shed. To the extent that establishing the tribunal gave outside powers the
sense that they were responding to the crisis in the Balkans, it only pro-
longed and aggravated the crisis-by giving an excuse for failing to take
more serious action.
In the meantime, the U.N. Security Council established a second tri-
bunal to deal with the far more massive horrors unleashed in Rwanda. 25 A
government controlled by Hutus had organized a systematic slaughter of
the country's Tutsi population in the spring of 1994. Over 800,000 people,
ranging from toddlers to grandmothers, were killed in the space of a few
weeks. It was one of the few episodes of mass killing in the post-war era
that could rightly be described as genocide. Far from acting to halt the
slaughter, the Security Council ordered the withdrawal of international
peacekeeping forces that were already in Rwanda, even when the com-
mander of those forces expressed willingness to intervene. 2 6 Home gov-
ernments of these forces (Canada and Belgium) did not want to risk their
23. Id.
24. See DAVID RHODE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S
WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II, 164 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1997). But see
HONIG & BOTH, supra note 22, at xviii, xx.
25. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 6, 1994) (establishing the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
26. See MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS To GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
RWANDA 78-229 (2002) (noting that the U.N. refused to take actions to avert mass
slaughter, even actions recommended by peacekeepers on the ground. When violence
began, U.N. officials ordered peacekeepers to concentrate on evacuating Europeans-
that is, whites-who were not themselves targets of the violence.).
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troops in active fighting. The Clinton administration supported the
impulse to disengage.
The genocide campaign was halted only when a Tutsi army, organized
in neighboring countries, ousted the Hutu government and established a
new government in Rwanda. Having done nothing at all to halt the horror,
the U.N. contented itself with sending lawyers after the fact. It established
a second tribunal in 1994 to assure that leading perpetrators of genocide
would not be left to the standards of justice that might be arranged by the
new Tutsi government.2 7 Another crisis, another tribunal-confirming, as
a prominent human rights advocate put it, that diplomats were offering
tribunals "as substitutes for effective action."28
By intervening when and where it did, the Security Council's response
to the Rwanda catastrophe risked giving the impression that the interna-
tional community was more concerned to protect the perpetrators of geno-
cide than its victims. Or, to put the point somewhat differently, the
Security Council's intervention seemed to imply that the international
community was more concerned to assure perfect justice for mass murder-
ers than to assure that mass murder would not take place. By taking the
perpetrators into international custody, the U.N. did assure them better
treatment-not only in access to lawyers and protections of due process,
but in food, medical care and daily amenities-than was available to those
with less blood on their hands. Perpetrators received better care than ordi-
nary Rwandans, suffering amidst the chaos and squalor of post-war condi-
tions. The U.N. may not have set out to protect perpetrators of mass
murder. But the result was implicit in the U.N.'s limited arsenal of
responses: when the most ready response is to send lawyers, the U.N. is
better equipped to protect criminals than their victims.
It is true, of course, that arranging for international intervention is
very much more difficult than arranging for tribunals. Still, the telling fact
is that, in the aftermath of the Rwandan catastrophe, the U.N. made only
the most desultory, half-hearted efforts to think about how international
responses might be organized to stave off mass murder in the next crisis.
Instead it went forward with more ambitious plans for international tribu-
nals. Four years after the Rwandan catastrophe, the U.N. had made no
progress in organizing a new structure to mobilize international military
interventions. Instead, the U.N. helped to launch an international criminal
tribunal-so that, for the next crisis, the U.N. would be equipped to
respond by . . . again threatening to send lawyers!
Indeed, the Statute of the ICC rather perversely denied the court juris-
diction-even for genocide-if the perpetrating government had refused to
sign, while subjecting soldiers and officials of intervening states to liability
for very broadly defined "war crimes" if their home government had signed
27. Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 7 Eu. J. INT'L L. 501, 506-07 (1996).
28. ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE 112 (Times Books 1998).
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on to the Statute.2 9 So, in the next conflict, a country that agreed to send
troops in a humanitarian intervention would be subject to scrutiny and
monitoring by the ICC. That fact, after all, provides another reason to
refrain from committing troops. In 2004, when the United States proposed
that the U.N. exempt authorized international forces from ICC jurisdiction,
the Security Council refused. 30 Upholding the authority of lawyers was
more important than preserving the capacity for effective military
responses. There were, of course, other considerations, at a time when the
Council was much divided over the American and British action in Iraq,
which had not received Council authorization. Still, the Council was clear
in its priorities: it wanted to preserve the authority of lawyers over the
capacity for military action.
Faced with a new humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan,
the Council hesitated. Some members used the word "genocide," which
after all requires "punishment" under international law. U.N. authorities
determined that the word "genocide" was improper, and the situation was
one of mass murder, but not quite "genocide." No serious discussion was
given to organizing an international intervention force. Council members
instead devoted their energies to arguing about the preferred response, ulti-
mately authorizing special jurisdiction for the ICC. When the United
States finally agreed to abstain from the vote authorizing ICC investiga-
tions, the Council had a policy: it would do nothing effective regarding
Darfur. It would leave the protection of people facing massed slaughter to
the protection of a counter force of ... lawyers in the Netherlands.
The most charitable interpretation of this pattern is that the interna-
tional community prefers to emphasize those responses which it is best
able to administer and it is easier to get agreement on the reasoned, deliber-
ative, procedurally bound work of lawyers than on military action, which is
so much more difficult to control from a distance. Better to emphasize
matters on which it is easier to get agreement.
But what can be agreed upon may not be sufficient or at all seriously
responsive to the challenge. Diplomats may find it easier to agree on a
lunch menu than on provisions of a peace deal. That doesn't make menu
planning a sensible focus for diplomacy. The comparison may seem frivo-
lous. The international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda were
not just offering a banquet table for international lawyers. If they were
supposed to be doing more serious things, however, there was not all that
much agreement on what those things should be.
IIl. Blind Justice, Bitter Politics
International justice may do little to stop butchery while it is occur-
ring. It may even offer a salve to tender consciences which delays or
29. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5, 12, 13, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
30. Colum Lynch, U.S. Alters its Plan for Exemption at Court, WASH. POST, June 23,
2004, at A13.
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deflects efforts to organize effective intervention. ("We have recruited the
best minds from the law schools, so we don't need to bother the military
academies or the war colleges.") Advocates of international criminal jus-
tice still can argue that international tribunals can provide decisive help,
after the slaughter has ended, when attention shifts to finding ways to heal
a torn and wounded society. At that stage, advocates argue, the interna-
tional community can provide specialists in justice, just as it often provides
specialists in epidemiology and food distribution.
Probably the best known academic study of the tribunals, a book by
the Canadian political scientist Gary Bass, sums up this argument in its
title: "Stay the Hand of Vengeance."3 1 Bass makes the seemingly plausible
argument that international justice can provide a more stable post-conflict
environment by assuring that justice is free from vengeful passions. By
fostering domestic stability in strife-torn lands, international tribunals can
contribute to international peace-at least as this argument would have it.
The argument has a superficial plausibility insofar as international
lawyers, recruited from outside the scene of the conflict and operating in
the calm atmosphere of The Hague, are far less likely to share in the pas-
sions of the partisans. Yet if the argument were actually compelling, we
would expect to see this solution adopted very widely. The general pat-
tern, however, is quite the opposite. It was not only the World War II vic-
tors who disdained to concede control of post-war prosecutions to the
international community. Some two-dozen states made transitions to
democracy in the 1990s, after the collapse of communism in Europe, after
the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, after the collapse of military dic-
tatorships in South America and the ending of bitter insurgences in Central
America. In almost every case, atrocities committed by the previous gov-
ernment had generated demands for justice-or retribution. So far from
inviting international authorities to supervise the implementation of jus-
tice, new regimes in almost every case proclaimed some form of general
amnesty for crimes committed under the old government (or acted as if
there had to be some practical equivalent to general amnesty).
In a number of cases-most notably in Chile and South Africa-a prior
promise of amnesty was the price paid by opponents of the old regime to
secure a peaceful transition.32 Those who held power agreed to give it up,
in return for promises not to seek retribution. Even where no formal agree-
ment of this kind was made, new governments had obvious incentives to
"stay the hand of vengeance" in order to conciliate previous supporters of
the old governments.
One can argue that some new governments failed in their duty to
implement adequate justice for past horrors. One can argue that short-
31. For assessments of the South African experience, see LYN S. GRABILL, TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2002). For more general discussion of such truth
commissions, in Latin America as well as in South Africa and eastern Europe, see TRUTH
V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert Rotberg & Dennis Thompson
eds., Princeton University Press 2000).
32. Id.
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term stability was bought at the price of lingering resentments or delu-
sions. One can argue that crimes too quickly buried will return to haunt
political life in these countries down the road. Arguments about historical
reckonings are worth pursuing but rarely yield any clear conclusions. After
the Second World War, revived democracies in Western Europe faced. the
challenge of apportioning responsibility for those who collaborated with
German crimes, which in every country included senior civil servants and
often very high level politicians. Not many were punished. Officials con-
nected with the most terrible crimes were allowed to pursue postwar
careers in the civil service and sometimes were found, decades later, to
have enjoyed considerable success in these careers, protected from legal
challenge by mysterious political forces in the background. 33 Still, it is not
at all obvious that postwar Germany, where outsiders initially organized
punitive justice, ended up with a more honest accounting of its own past
and a more reliably tolerant or democratic political culture in subsequent
decades. 34
For new governments, at any rate, future political consequences must
often give way to immediate needs. To reach a future in which a stable
democracy has come to terms with a terrible past, transition governments
must get through the stresses of the present. The compromises that gov-
ernments make-with justice, with truth, with security and with public
feeling-are often controversial. That is the stuff of politics. But there is no
general consensus on what compromises should be made in what
circumstances.
To suppose that international tribunals can do a better job with these
challenges, one must suppose that it is possible to provide justice without
compromise, without regard for circumstances. That is the implication of
the structures established for the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals. There is
no provision for pardon or amnesty. Such exceptions from the law are
granted, in national systems, at the discretion of executive or legislative
authorities on broadly political grounds. Neither the charters of the special
tribunals nor the Rome Statute acknowledge any need for such exceptions.
33. For succinct review of postwar protection provided to French civil servants who
helped administer mass murder during the Vichy years, see ANTHONY BEEVOR & ARTEMIS
COOPER, PARIS AFTER THE LIBERATION 384-87 (Penguin 2004). For more general treat-
ment, comparing experience in several countries, see THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION IN
EUROPE, WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH 300 (Istvan Deak et al. eds., 2002), which
sums up the pattern of "justice" offered in the first years after the war as "so partial and
aborted" but notes that justice in France was particularly "partial and aborted." In the
French approach, the "emphasis was clearly placed upon the need to reduce to the mini-
mum the number of convicted persons" and "reserve for this select few a sort of sym-
bolic and representative function" while "leav[ing] the rest of the social fabric untouched
... through a process of benign collective neglect." Id. at 302.
34. A poll conducted in 2004, for example, found that a majority of Germans believe
policies of the Israeli government, in resisting terror attacks, were comparable to the
genocide perpetrated by Germany in the Second World War. Whatever else this finding
indicates, it does not speak well for the educational value of Nuremberg and other post-
war trials. See E. Lefkovits, German poll equating Israeli, Nazi tactics, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 9, 2004; Robin Shepherd, In Europe, An Unhealthy Fixation on Israel, WASH. POST,
Jan. 30, 2005, at B03.
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Perhaps that is because acknowledging the need for exceptions would raise
awkward questions about who is empowered to make such political judg-
ments and on what grounds. It is safer to pretend that the tribunals answer
entirely to the law and to nothing but the law.
But this is, of course, a pretense. Tens of thousands of individuals
might have been liable to prosecution under the jurisdictions accorded to
the Hague tribunals. The tribunals, however, were not equipped to handle
more than a few dozen prosecutions. The choice of which cases to pursue
and which to disregard inevitably raised questions about priorities, if not
consequences. Even judges, in established national courts, have been
known to cast one eye at least on policy considerations. Certainly prosecu-
tors must give some thought to the political implications of the way they
exercise their discretion. That is why, in common law countries, prosecu-
tors have always been regarded as properly accountable to political authori-
ties (or to voters). In recent political memory, Americans rejected the
notion that an "independent prosecutor" could be trusted to make non-
partisan decisions when investigating a sitting president-even when the
prosecutor was the respected former judge, Kenneth Starr.
Once one acknowledges that prosecutors of international tribunals are
exercising discretion, one might still defend their judgments as guided by
conscientious concern for doing the best possible job with limited
resources. But it is not saying much to claim that international prosecutors
must disregard partisan or personal agendas. What is an improper distrac-
tion and what is a proper consideration of policy? If one drops the pre-
tense that international prosecutors are simply guided by the law, one must
assume that international prosecutors are likely to be more honest, or more
informed, or more astute, in grappling with policy considerations, than
their domestic counterparts in the affected countries. Yet it is hard to see
why we should credit such assumptions.
International prosecutors are accountable to the international commu-
nity, whatever that may mean. The international community is likely to be
paying much less attention to the consequences of prosecutions in a partic-
ular country than the people who live in that country. A domestic prosecu-
tor must live with the people affected by his decisions, while the
international prosecutor can move on to new assignments, without ever
returning to that country. Apart from motivation, the domestic prosecutor
will generally be familiar with the language and culture of the offenders as
well as the victims. The domestic prosecutor will likely have a much more
informed understanding of the challenges facing the new government for
which he acts. The international prosecutor may know almost nothing
about the country to which he has been assigned to deliver justice. Why
suppose that the international prosecutor will do a better job?
After more than ten years of experience with the Yugoslav and Rwanda
tribunals, these are no longer abstract or speculative questions. Judged
from the perspective of those most affected, these tribunals have not per-
formed well at all. Even judged from the perspective of the international
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community (or its representatives in the Security Council) they have not
performed well.
The most obvious problem is that the tribunals have proceeded at an
agonizingly slow pace. 'Justice delayed is justice denied." That is an
American adage, not always honored in American courts. But the person-
nel of the international tribunals seem never to have heard of this adage. In
the first five years after the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) was established, it had not achieved a single conviction.35 In its
first ten years, it had convicted twenty perpetrators, while promising to
reach verdicts on another twenty-five individuals over the next four years. 36
The Rwandan government, with one-tenth of the funding available to -the
ICTR, had imposed verdicts on 5,000 cases in the first five years after the
Tutsis came to power. 37 It was not that the Rwandan government simply
pursued lesser offenders. In over a hundred cases, Rwandan courts
imposed death sentences for the crimes involved. The ICTR was pre-
cluded, by its organizing statutes, from imposing any sentence beyond life
imprisonment, so excessive haste might not have been quite so much of a
danger. But the international prosecutors did not even focus on the worst
offenders-at least not exclusively.
The Yugoslav tribunal proceeded at an equally glacial pace. After ten
years, it had reached thirty-six "judgments"-some of which were only set-
ling procedural questions-while actual trials continued. An additional
forty-two indictments, accumulated by 2003, had not yet proceeded to trial.
In half of these cases, the accused were not yet in custody; of the remain-
der, half were already five years old.38  The Security Council finally
became so impatient with the pace of the tribunals that, in 2003, it
demanded that the tribunals finish their trials within the next five years. 3 9
The ICTR, looking to cut down on its case load to comply with these dead-
lines, then announced that it was relinquishing custody of forty-one perpe-
trators (nearly forty percent of those who were then being held for trial
35. See BASS, supra note 31, at 307-08 (noting that Rwandan national courts had
handed down over one hundred death sentences and a comparable number of sentences
of life imprisonment in a period in which the international tribunal had not managed to
conclude a single trial. "No one," he concludes, "should have expected the Rwandans to
be as unconcerned about the punishment of the genocide as the UN was.").
36. Claude Jorda, President of the ICTR, Ninth Annual Report of the ICTR, transmitted
by the Secretary-General to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/
2004/601, A/59/183 (July 27, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/
2002/index.htm (reporting status of cases as of June 30, 2004).
37. See Richard Sezibera, The Only Way to Bring Justice to Rwanda, WASH. POST, April
7, 2002, at B1 (noting that national courts in Rwanda, with one tenth of the funding
supplied to the international tribunal, had rendered judgments in more than 5,000
cases, while the international tribunal was still struggling through its first dozen cases);
see also Mark A. Drubl, Lecture, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIo
N.U. L. REv. 41, 46 (2005).
38. See Theodor Meron, President of the ICTR, Tenth Annual Report of the ICTR,
transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council and the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. S/2003/829, A/58/297 (Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
rappannu-e/2003/index.htm.
39. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
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before the ICTR) on the grounds that these individuals were on the
grounds that they were only "low-level participants" rather than among
those who "bear the gravest responsibility for the crimes committed."
40
The ICTR has not explained why its prosecutors claimed jurisdiction
over non-major perpetrators in the first place. One can draw some infer-
ences from previous prosecutions, however. Among those held accounta-
ble in the first twenty trials were officials charged with sexual humiliation
of Tutsi women (though not with actual rape, let alone murder). The point,
it seems, was to set a precedent for future tribunals. 41 Doing justice for
Rwanda was a lesser priority than building up case law for a global law of
criminal justice. The Tutsi government became so furious with the tribu-
nal's priorities that at one point it simply refused to issue visas to the inter-
national prosecutor and her staff to enter Rwanda-though this was
somewhat less disabling to international prosecutors than it might seem,
since the trials took place in neighboring Tanzania. 42
In the Yugoslav tribunal, meanwhile, prosecutors initially withheld
any indictment of Slobodon Milogevit, president of Serbia, while handing
down a number of indictments against Serb-backed militia commanders in
Bosnia. It is likely that the prosecutors had at least one eye on the prefer-
ence of NATO governments in the mid-1990s. NATO was negotiating with
Milogevit in the mid-1990s to achieve a settlement to the fighting in Bosnia
and NATO countries provided almost all the peace-keeping forces on the
ground in Bosnia, on which the tribunal was dependent to execute its
arrest warrants. It might also have been somewhat relevant that NATO
members constituted a majority of the permanent members of the Security
Council, which established the ICTY and had to approve its continued
funding.
In 1999, NATO demanded the withdrawal of Serb forces from
Kosovo-and then commenced a bombing campaign against Serbia, when
the Milo~evit government rejected this ultimatum. In the midst of the
bombing campaign, the ICTY announced that it would prosecute Milogevit
for war crimes in Bosnia-crimes that had occurred years earlier. 4 3 In the
40. See Ninth Annual Report of the ICTR, supra note 36, at 2-3.
41. If such precedent-setting efforts were a bid for mention in casebooks, they
achieved their goal. See HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALs 1887-88 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing cases establish-
ing that "sexual violence" may "include acts which do not involve ... physical contact"
and that "coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force."
While these are entirely plausible claims for a domestic legal system, they are not, one
might think, of highest priority for prosecutors faced with an actual pattern of mass
murder that had consumed 800,000 lives.
42. For an extended survey of complaints about the operations of the ICTR, see
Hans Nichols, U.N. Court Makes Legal Mischief, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, January 20, 2003
(concluding, "[ilt's clear the lawyers and judges of the ICTR like the idea of working on
behalf of humanity rather than something as trifling or temporal as a country such as
Rwanda and its 800,000 dead")
43. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment (Apr. 21,
2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai040421-e.htm
(Bosnia).
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meantime, prosecutors arranged for light treatment of an official of the
Serb enclave in Bosnia, who had been directly connected with atrocities
there but could provide valuable testimony against Miloevit.
Almost two years after his indictment by the tribunal, Milo~evit was
actually delivered to The Hague for trial. He had already been forced out of
power after street protests prevented him from declaring himself the win-
ner in a popular election. The new government was a coalition of demo-
cratic reformers and disillusioned supporters of Milo~evit (whose wars had
ended in failure and whose domestic policies had brought economic
chaos). The new government's bid to organize its own trial of Milo~evit
was rejected by the ICTY, however. Western governments (including the
United States) insisted that aid to the new democratic government would
not be forthcoming unless Milo~evit were extradited to The Hague.
What followed was not a good example for international justice. After
Milogevit's extradition, the ICTY insisted that it would also seek indict-
ments of others in his immediate entourage. This announcement exacer-
bated strains in the new coalition in Belgrade and ultimately led to the
assassination of the prime minister who had arranged the extradition of
Milo~evit. 4 4 Meanwhile, at The Hague, after many delays, Milo~evit
turned his trial into an occasion for endless demagogic speeches-hours
and hours of which were broadcast into Serbia and helped turn Serb opin-
ion in his favor.4 5 Miloevi's party gained seats at the next election, even
with Milo~evit on the list of candidates for parliament. And the trial
ground on and on and on, still far from ending after four years of
proceedings.
Questioned about the extreme sluggishness of these proceedings,
Judge Patricia Wald, a U.S. federal appeals court judge serving on the ICTY
appeals panel at The Hague, explained to a congressional hearing that
delays were the price paid to achieve the tribunal's highest priority: "We
have to assure that justice is seen to be done."'4 6 It is, perhaps, a laudable
aim. But if that is the standard, it is clear that it was not achieved-if the
seeing that matters is in Yugoslavia or Rwanda. Perhaps what Judge Wald
had in mind was the way these trials were "seen" by the world at large.
That remains a strange perspective, however. In Germany, the Nurem-
berg tribunal took eleven months, from the opening gavel at the bench to
the last swing of the gallows for the condemned. Only a few months into
the trials, Allied governments were pressing the prosecutors to speed things
up. Perhaps the requisites of international consultation slowed things
down. In France, the trial of the chief wartime collaborator, Pierre Laval,
44. See Daniel Simpson, Serbs' Premier is Assassinated; Led in Reforms, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2003, at Al.
45. See Michael Scharf, Errors and Missteps: Key Lessons the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Can Learn from the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT'L 1.J. infra, at § I.E. ITo
Televise or Not to Televise?] (2005) (discussing the use of television in international
tribunals as a soapbox).
46. The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice or
Show of Justice? Hearing before the Comm. on International Relations, 107th Cong.
(2002).
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took four days. Laval's execution followed in less than a week.47 Perhaps
these earlier trials were far from perfect. But there was a political need to
achieve some rapid sense of closure to facilitate postwar reconstruction.
For Serbs, the international community is in no hurry; even less so for
Rwandans. Not until every procedural refinement has been considered can
the trials move forward. But of course, they won't be regarded as perfect
justice in any case. Nor should they be, given the improvised procedures, a
mish-mash of civil law and common law procedures.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) pro-
hibits ad hoc tribunals, presumably on the ground that they will cause sus-
picion of injustice.48 But ad hoc is precisely the term to describe these
unique international tribunals. It is revealing that apologists for these
tribunals ignore this awkward fact. The ICCPR reflects a concern that
tribunals established for special purposes will deliver a level of justice that
is distorted by these special purposes. Advocates for international justice
seem to have imagined that ad hoc international tribunals could somehow
transcend the special political contexts that produced these special tribu-
nals and so provide a quality of justice that would be above reproach.
What these ad hoc tribunals actually succeeded in doing was confirming
that lawyers in distant forums aren't good political calculators for the coun-
tries they purport to be serving. Serving humanity is something different
than serving a particular political community. What serving humanity
means, it turns out, is serving no particular set of human beings.
IV. Justice for Humanity is not Justice
Advocates for global justice may concede that international justice is,
other things being equal, not preferable to local or national justice. That
seems to be the premise of the Statute for the ICC, which provides for inter-
national jurisdiction only when national justice systems have not taken
adequate measures to prosecute the offenses enumerated in the Statute.
International justice might still have appeal as a back-stop to national
justice.
47. For a vivid account of the political pressures driving the trial toward its rapid
and predetermined conclusion, see ANTHONY BEEVOR & ARTEMIS COOPER, PARIs AFTER THE
LIBERATION, 1944-1949, at 165-69 (1994).
48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M, 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [herein-
after ICCPR] ("In the determination of any criminal charge ... everyone shall be enti-
tled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law."). When a defendant before the ad hoc tribunal for Yugoslavia pro-
tested that the ICTY had been established by special resolution of the U.N. Security
Council, rather than "by law," the appeals chamber of the tribunal rejected this provision
of the ICCPR as inapplicable: "[Tlhe principle that a tribunal must be established by
law . . . is a general principle of law imposing an international obligation which only
applies to the administration of criminal justice in a municipal setting" (rather than to
international tribunals established, on whatever basis, by international authorities).
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, 106 I.L.R. 453, Decision on the Defense Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995).
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But the premise remains that international justice is, in some sense,
more reliably available than national justice. And there is no good reason
to believe this premise. Why believe that the international community is
more committed to seeing justice done-in any particular nation-than the
people who live in that nation? Experience suggests the opposite.
If one judges by aggregate death tolls, the communist regimes in Soviet
Russia and China were the most murderous of the twentieth century.
When the Soviet regime collapsed in 1991, there was an opportunity for
calling to account the surviving perpetrators of mass murder under that
regime. The international community did not demand any accounting.
The new government in Russia sought financial assistance from western
nations. It sought new treaty relationships. It even sought admission to
the Council of Europe and participation in the treaty system established
under the European Convention on Human Rights. The United States and
the European democracies did press for liberalizing and democratizing
reforms in post-communist Russia. But they did not press for prosecution
of communist crimes. And there were none. There was not even an official
accounting for past crimes by a truth commission, as in Chile or South
Africa.
So with China. China was encouraged to continue reforms that estab-
lished a greater measure of freedom. It was admitted to the World Trade
Organization at the end of the 1990s. So far from pressing China to
account for mass atrocities of the Mao era, European delegates to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission refused even to support U.S. proposals to
investigate existing standards of human rights protection in the liberalizing
Chinese regime of the 1990s. 49 So in China, as in Russia, the government
made little effort to provide an official accounting, let alone actual prosecu-
tions, for monstrous crimes committed in the past.
One can argue that forbearance in these circumstances was a sound
policy, because liberalizing reforms in post-communist Russia and China
might have been jeopardized by international demands for raking over past
horrors. One can argue that the international community had no strong
reason to demand prosecutions and accountings, when people in these
countries did not demand them-or at least, did not mobilize on behalf of
such claims in visible ways. Perhaps people in these countries had their
own reasons not to press claims that might have jeopardized reformist
trends under the post-communist governments.
In effect, the international community preferred peace to justice and
perhaps that was also the preference of the populations most affected.
Still, it is wrong to think that local acquiescence leaves international justice
looking roughly comparable, when international and local opinion are
comparably indifferent to demands for accountability. At the end of the
day, citizens of an affected nation have to live there. Governments, even
49. For a survey of European refusal to seek investigation of Chinese human rights
abuses by the U.N. Human Rights Commission, see STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 41, at
634-40.
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undemocratic governments, have the responsibility for coping with local
situations. International authorities do not acknowledge the same sort of
responsibility. Even when the international community sends peace-keep-
ing forces to a troubled region, they do not exert the full responsibility of
governing. Among other things, they do not assert the full claims to con-
trol that sovereign states are expected to maintain (and indeed, under tradi-
tional notions of international law, are actually obligated to maintain).
The situation in Bosnia in the 1990s is revealing of the problem. Inter-
national peace-keepers sometimes failed even to protect civilians from mur-
derous assault by opposing ethnic militias. International forces were
certainly not willing to take risks to apprehend perpetrators of atrocities
sought by the distant tribunal in The Hague. Even the perpetrators of the
terrible massacre at Srebrenica were never apprehended. Soldiers of NATO
nations did not make any great effort to hunt them down. International
forces in Bosnia did not place a high priority on executing arrest warrants
from the tribunal in The Hague, since they had not been fielded by the
lawyers in The Hague and did not report to a common command structure
encompassing prosecutors in The Hague. There was a considerable gulf
between the priorities of The Hague and the priorities of the home govern-
ments of the outside military forces in Yugoslavia. And that should have
been expected. The soldiers were not part of the same state structure as
the Hague tribunal. They had no very strong reason to vindicate the
abstract authority of the international tribunal. Criminals may elude cap-
ture even in national justice systems in well-ordered states. But sovereign
states have strong incentives to demonstrate their control of their territory.
That means, among other things, these states have strong incentives to
enforce obedience to their own court systems.
The international community does not have strong incentives to seek
justice in any particular case precisely because it does not have sufficient
control over any particular territory. The world at large-if one can attri-
bute any sort of motivation or priority to an amorphous collection of so
many different states and peoples-necessarily sets a higher priority on
dampening conflict between states than on assuring justice among individ-
uals. The international community is not organized to govern specific peo-
ples or territories. That is precisely the purpose of sovereign states.
In these circumstances, it is fair to ask whether the international com-
munity really has any moral claim to impose justice on individuals. It may
be true that in many cases, if international tribunals cannot act, no action
will be taken. That is not, in itself, a particularly compelling argument for
international justice. The question remains whether international justice
really contributes very much of what criminal justice is supposed to
provide.
To see the point, one has only to consider the objections to unautho-
rized justice. For victims or their relatives to take the law into their own
hands is usually condemned on the ground that lynch law is likely to be
excessive or reckless. But suppose that perpetrators of mass murder have
escaped punishment. Suppose that relatives of the victims have tracked
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and cornered the perpetrators. Suppose they are even prepared to offer
some form of proceeding before imposing just punishment. Probably most
people can sympathize with the moral claim of the avengers in the circum-
stances. Still, it seems to be the common intuition that private justice of
this kind is not at all an adequate substitute for criminal justice delivered
by proper authorities. Private justice, in these circumstances, is not really
the kind of justice that criminal justice systems aim to provide.
The case, as it happens, is not hypothetical. A considerable amount of
effort has been devoted, over the past sixty years, to identifying Nazi war
criminals. Most of the participants in one of history's greatest crimes man-
aged to escape without punishment. But there have been few recorded acts
of private justice to compensate for the inadequacies of official justice. In
the immediate aftermath of the war, there were, in fact, schemes hatched by
survivors to do justice by inflicting mass death on captured Nazis. Zionist
officials in Palestine seem to have intervened to prevent such plans from
being carried out-apparently on the assumption that retaliation in kind
by private avengers would not be widely recognized as justice and so would
not achieve a central aim of justice.50 It would not give moral authority to
the condemnation of these crimes, because it would not demonstrate a sys-
tematic determination to judge and punish such crimes in the future.
The most obvious objection to private justice is that clandestine aveng-
ers may make mistakes, misidentifying their targets, punishing those who
are innocent or not nearly so guilty as others. At the best, this justice will
be "irregular." But that is not simply an objection on behalf of "defend-
ants." Private justice does not convey what official justice is supposed to
convey: the formal judgment of an entire community. Jewish officials in
Palestine condemned private vengeance against Nazi war criminals in the
aftermath of the Second World War. A dozen years later, the same political
leaders organized a major trial in Jerusalem for Adolf Eichmann, the man
who had organized a major part of the Nazi genocide during the war. That
trial had a very different meaning, because it was undertaken by an organ-
ized state. It was a state with plausible claims to punish the mass murder
of Jews, because it had devoted much energy to organizing the necessary
means to repel murderous attacks on Jews.
There were jurisdictional difficulties with the Eichmann trial, as there
had been jurisdictional disputes about the original trials at Nuremberg.
There was some point in the protest that the trial of German criminals by
outside powers was an exercise in "victor's justice." Trials organized by
outsiders did not have the same moral force as trials organized by German
authorities might have had. But for some time after the war, it was not
certain that Germans, on their own, could sustain a government capable of
expressing the condemnations that a decent community would be expected
to express. Germany had no government of its own at the time of the
50. RICH COHEN, THE AVENGERS 197-203 (Knopf 2000) (describing a plan to poison
vast numbers of Germans, which was averted when the organizer was arrested by British
authorities, reportedly on a tip from Jewish leaders in Palestine, "perhaps by Ben-Gurion
himself').
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Allied trials. When self-government was restored to West Germany, politi-
cians clamored for amnesty and pardon of war criminals, rather than see-
ing through the efforts at punitive justice initiated by the Allies.5 '
But whatever objections might be raised against trials of German war
criminals by outsiders, the most confused objection to such ventures in
"victor's justice" is that the victors were not neutral. The proposal to
involve jurists from neutral powers was actually advanced by German
defense counsel at the original Nuremberg trials. Allied judges dismissed
it out of hand, and very reasonably so. The Allied powers were responsible
for Germany at that time. Their authority derived, as the International Mil-
itary Tribunal judges ruled, from Germany's surrender to these powers.5 2
Justice from bystanders is not an improvement over victor's justice.
The victors in a just war have at least devoted their own efforts to fighting
wrongdoers. The moral claim of bystanders has very little weight. If they
are less self-interested than accusing victors, they are more remote from the
crimes. Bystanders may offer sympathy. What victims of crime seek is
something more than sympathy.
The most compelling claim of victims is for official acknowledgment
that what they suffered was indeed criminal. That acknowledgement does
not carry much weight when offered by bystanders who made no effort to
stop the crimes when they were occurring and make no commitment to
stop their recurrence in the future. Victors in a just war have better claims
to judge than mere bystanders. But even victors, if they are outsiders who
will not remain to govern the defeated nation, cannot speak with the full
moral weight of a normal criminal justice system. The most compelling
justice comes from a court system which can claim to speak in the name of
the society where the victims suffered. In the proper setting, criminal pun-
ishment says, "The community acknowledges that a terrible wrong was
done and state organs, in the name of this society, are committed to pun-
ishing this wrong, to prevent, as much as possible, such wrongs from
recurring."
Bystanders cannot make this claim. Not concerned enough to inter-
vene when the crimes occurred, they make no commitment to act against
such crimes in the future. Condemnations from bystanders merely
represent opinions-opinions backed by no organized, systematic or mean-
ingful commitment. Condemnation from bystanders has all the moral
weight of a sympathy card, purchased for a dollar at a convenience store
and sent on by ordinary mail. Gestures of sympathy are no substitute for
justice.
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No one should be surprised, therefore, that Iraqis did not embrace the
prospect of an international trial for Saddam Hussein. Certainly the U.N.
had done nothing to earn the trust of ordinary Iraqis. It had treated a mon-
strous tyranny as a legitimate government. It had imposed economic sanc-
tions over more than decade, causing great suffering to ordinary Iraqis
while allow the tyranny to enrich itself through side deals with corrupt
international bureaucrats and corrupt officials of foreign governments.5 3
It refused to endorse the military intervention of the Anglo-American coali-
tion that finally ended the Ba'athist tyranny. And in the ensuing terrorist
insurgency, the U.N. withdrew its own official assistance mission after one
terror attack on their headquarters in Baghdad.5 4
Iraqis had more reason to trust an American organized trial of Saddam
and his criminal subordinates. The United States at least had been pre-
pared to commit its own troops to remove Saddam and had demonstrated
its willingness to maintain a sizable military presence in the country to
restore some degree of peace and stability when terrorists threatened to
reduce Iraq to chaos-or to reimpose a new tyranny. Still, Iraqis had rea-
son enough not to place great trust in American justice, either. The Ameri-
cans lacked the capacity-whether through lack of understanding or lack
of troop strength-to prevent a murderous terror insurgency from gaining
momentum in the first years after Saddam's removal. American troops
were not likely to remain for very long in significant numbers. If Iraq could
achieve peace and stability under a decent administration, it would have to
do so, in the end, with its own newly organized army and police, answering
to its own new government. Why shouldn't the government which sought
to rally the hopes of Iraqis for the future also claim the right to do justice
for terrible crimes in the past? Why wouldn't an Iraqi government be the
most proper authority to impose justice on Saddam and his fellow
criminals? Why wouldn't Iraqi justice be most reassuring to ordinary
Iraqis? Why wouldn't Iraqi justice have the greatest moral resonance-as
justice by a government that takes responsibility for preventing such hor-
rors in the future, as justice by a government that can claim to speak for the
priorities of the Iraqi people?
It is, perhaps, the extreme difficulty of answering these questions in
the negative that allowed the world to acquiesce to the Iraqi refusal of inter-
national involvement in the trial of Saddam and other Ba'athist criminals.
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In this case, an international tribunal was not required to console the inter-
national community for failing to take more effective action against Sad-
dam. Results that required military intervention had already been
achieved-by the military action of the American-led coalition. In this case,
the question was simply whether justice would be better served by an inter-
national tribunal or a national trial. And there turned out not to be many
voices insisting that remote, irresponsible international civil servants in
The Hague were the best people to put in charge of something so sensi-
tive-and so crucial to Iraqis-as the trial of the deposed tyrant.
Or perhaps it was simply that, an international community which
could not muster the will to deal with Saddam while he was in power, natu-
rally lacked the will to impose its preferences regarding the trial of a
deposed and captured Saddam. But that is enough to make the point.
Justice is a serious and often difficult responsibility. It is far too seri-
ous to be left to an entity so distracted, so divided, so diffuse as "the inter-
national community." What hope there is for justice in this world must be
a hope that resides, where justice has always been sought in the past: in the
governments of sovereign nations. It was possible to forget this fact in the
giddy, frivolous atmosphere of the 1990s. What previous generations took
for granted, the world of the early 21st Century has now relearned. In a
more serious world, the lesson is not likely to be forgotten. It is certainly
not likely to be effaced by an international criminal court, promising to do
justice for humanity, but equipped only to divert a specialized coterie of
legal scholars. Justice is too serious to be left to international bureaucrats.

